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The application of a harmless errorstandardby appellate courts reviewing
erroneous denials of counsel in child protective cases undermines a critical
procedural right that safeguards the interests of parents and children. Case law
reveals that trial courts, on numerous occasions, improperly reject valid
requestsfor counsel, forcing parents to navigate the child welfare system without
an advocate.' Appellate courts excuse these violations by speculating that the
denials caused no significant harm to the parents,2 which is a conclusion that a
court can never reach with any certainty.
The only appropriate remedy for this significant problem is a bright-line
rule requiring the automatic reversal of the termination of parental rights (TPR)
decision in situations where a parent is denied the assistance of an attorney at
critical stages of the case leading up to the TPR hearing. This rule is consistent
with the United States Supreme Court'sjurisprudenceconcerning the denial of
counsel in criminal cases3 and would, as a matter of policy, lead to better
outcomes for children in foster care. It would also help further the appearance
of a just decision making process that respects the rights of all parties affected

*Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See, e.g., In re Interest of E.J.C., 731 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (noting that
the district court denied the mother's request for a court-appointed attorney in the termination of
parental rights proceeding because the district court deemed the request untimely).
2.
See, e.g., People ex rel. S.D. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 691 N.W.2d 586, 592 (S.D. 2004)
("Although the trial court erred by not ensuring representation by counsel at the adjudicatory phase,
that error was harmless because it did not taint the disposition of this matter, and remanding for an
adjudicatory hearing would accomplish nothing.").
3.
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 468 (1997)).
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by the child welfare system-an important consideration given the current
perceptions of the system.4
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court applies a bright-line test when trial courts
erroneously deny counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases at critical
stages of the proceedings. When such a deprivation occurs, the Court regards
the mistake as a structural error, automatically reversing the conviction without
engaging in a fact-specific inquiry about whether the defendant was harmed by
the deprivation of counsel. The Court adopted this approach "because counsel
is critical to a fair trial and no one can reliably determine the level of prejudice
arising from the denial of a right to counsel." The deprivation "affect[s] the
framework within which the trial proceeds,",7 and in the absence of the right to
counsel, a "trial cannot reliably serve its functon as a vehicle for determination8
of guilt or innocence" and the result cannot be viewed as "fundamentally fair."
As Justice Scalia explained in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,9 where a

litigant's right to counsel has been violated, a harmless error analysis "would be
a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe."'
Nearly every appellate court across the country has adopted an identical
approach when addressing erroneous denials of counsel in TPR cases, in which a
right to counsel exists in most states primarily through state statutes and court
rules."' When that right has been violated at a TPR hearing, courts have
automatically reversed the termination decrees. 12 In adopting the standard of

4. See Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the
Warren Years, 20 FAM L.Q. 255, 257 (1986) ("Although child welfare services can and should be a
critical and constructive point of intervention into the lives of these children and their
families ...child welfare systems often inflict additional harm on already damaged children ... .
5.
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468).
6. See State v. Shirley E. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Torrance P., Jr.), 724
N.W.2d 623, 635 (Wis. 2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's automatic reversal rule where
criminal defendant has been totally deprived of counsel).
7. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
8.
Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
9.
548 U.S. 140 (2006).
10. Id. at 150.
11. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560(a) (2010) ("Parents, guardians, or other persons
subject to a termination of parental rights action are entitled to legal counsel. Those persons unable
to afford legal representation must be appointed counsel by the family court, unless the defendant is
in default.").
12. See Smoke v. State, Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 378 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979); Daniel Y. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 77 P.3d 55, 61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Imperial Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Maria F. (In re Michelle C.), 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 125, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
J.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 703 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Wilkins v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 337 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1985); In re Interest of J.M.B., 676
S.E.2d 9, 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Doe (In re Interest of Doe), 850 P.2d 211, 216 (Idaho Ct.
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automatic reversal, state courts have followed the primary reasoning employed
by the Supreme Court in criminal cases, that the level of prejudice cannot be
ascertained when counsel has been denied.1 3 For example, in In re Michelle

C.,14 the California Court of Appeals noted that "reversal is required regardless
' 15
of the outcome, because we cannot say that the proceeding itself was fair.
Similarly, in In re Termination of Parental Rights to Torrance P., Jr., 16 the

Wisconsin Supreme Court, in characterizing the error as structural, observed that
a termination proceeding "cannot reliably serve its function" and that the
"fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding ...[is] placed in doubt" when
counsel is wrongly denied. 17 Appellate courts have consistently followed this
approach when trial courts erroneously deny counsel to parents at TPR
hearings. 18
But, when confronted with the wrongful denial of counsel to parents in the
critical hearings leading up to the final TPR hearing, appellate courts have been
split on whether to apply a rule of automatic reversal. While a few courts have

App. 1993); In re Adoption of Sotelo, 474 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985); Taylor v. Scott (In
re Adoption of Taylor), 570 N.E.2d 1333, 1335-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); In re Interest of E.J.C.,
731 N.W.2d 402,404 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007); A.P. v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2008); In re Adoption of Imelda, 892 N.E.2d 336, 346-47 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Dick (In re Keifer), 406 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); In re Interest of
J.S.W., 295 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Wilkinson v. Thornton (In re K.L.T.), 237
S.W.3d 605, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 130 (Mont. 1993); Little v.
Little, 487 S.E.2d 823, 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); In re Sheffey, 854 N.E.2d 508, 513 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2006); Lynda S. v. State (In re Chad S.), 580 P.2d 983, 986 (Okla. 1978); Sweetin v. State (In
re S.S.), 90 P.3d 571, 577 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 603 (Pa.
1973); In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 572-73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); In re Interest of T.C.B., No. 0802-00515-CV, 2003 WL 21810958, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2003); In re Welfare of G.E., 65
P.3d 1219, 1226 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); In re Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110, 125 (W. Va. 1995); In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Torrance P., Jr., 724 N.W.2d at 635; State v. Patti P. (In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Phillip E.), No. 2007AP324, 2007 WL 2769400, at *4-5 (Wis. Ct.
App. Sept. 25, 2007); see also Williams v. Bentley, 809 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(noting that denial of the right to counsel in a private custody proceeding required reversal "without
regard to the merits of the unrepresented party's position"); Richard v. Michna, 431 S.E.2d 485, 488
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the TPR decision because the court failed to appoint a guardian ad
litem for a mentally disabled mother as required by state law, even though the court believed that
the mother was not prejudiced).
13. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
14. 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 125 (Ct. App. 2005).
15. Id.at 139.
16. 724 N.W.2d 623 (Wis. 2006).
17. Id. at 635. See also In re J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d at 12 ("[W]hen the state is terminating a
parent's 'fundamental and fiercely guarded right' to his or her child.., the total and erroneous
denial of appointed counsel during the termination hearing is presumptively harmful because it calls
into question the very structural integrity of the fact-finding process." (quoting Nix v. Dep't of
Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307 (Ga. 1976))).
18. See cases cited supra note 12.
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automatically reversed TPR decisions on this basis,' 9 a larger number of
appellate courts have employed a harmless error test and have placed the burden
on parents to demonstrate how the earlier appointment of counsel would have
changed the outcome in the case. 2°
Consider the following examples that demonstrate the flux created by these
divergent approaches.
On May 16, 2004, the children of Miguel Meza-Cabrera were placed in
foster care after the state alleged that his children were living in inadequate
conditions and were lacking stability.2 1 Mr. Meza-Cabrera was incarcerated at
the time the children were removed and throughout the entirety of the case. 2 ' On
May 20, 2004, the trial court, as required by state law, ordered that Mr. MezaCabrera be appointed an attorney to represent him. 23 Counsel, however, was not
actually provided to him for nearly two years. 24 During the time he was without
counsel, the court determined that the state's allegations were true, adjudicated
the children neglected, placed the children in foster care, and considered, but
ultimately denied, moving the children to a relative's home. 25 Subsequently, the
26
He
court terminated Mr. Meza-Cabrera's parental rights.
27 was represented by
then.
before
time
some
for
counsel at that final hearing and
Mr. Meza-Cabrera's story is comparable to that of Rosa C., who had her
two-month-old child, Elijah, removed from her care in June 2005 because of

19. E.g., T.B. v. State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 624 So.
2d 792, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the mother was not advised of her right to
counsel at the dependency hearing and consequently reversing the trial court's TPR order).
20. See Jefferson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 158 S.W.3d 129, 136 (Ark. 2004); Briscoe
v. State, Dep't of Human Servs., 912 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ark. 1996); Meza-Cabrera v. Ark. Dep't of
Human Servs., No. CA 07-932, 2008 WL 376290, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008); Farmer v.
Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 06-185, 2006 WL 2879454, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 11,
2006); Fresno Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lucia R. (In re Ronald R.), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 30-31
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Hughes v. Div. of Family Servs., 836 A.2d 498, 512 (Del. 2003); State ex rel.
T.D. v. R.D., 781 So. 2d 871, 875-76 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Bryant (In re
Gentry), No. 287137, 2009 WL 485397, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2009) (per curiam); Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Coleman (In re Coleman), No. 287191, 2009 WL 456380, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 2009) (per curiam); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shabazz (In re Shabazz), No. 286130, 2009
WL 325316, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009) (per curiam); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Craven
(In re Perri), No. 280156, 2008 WL 1991736, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. May 8, 2008) (per curiam);
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hall (In re Hall), 469 N.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); In re
Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009 WL2998116, at *13 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009); In re
D.S., 833 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Mont. 1992); People ex rel. S.D. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 691 N.W.2d 586,
592 (S.D. 2004); In re Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 470 S.E.2d 177, 186 (W. Va. 1996); MN v.
State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re Interest of MN), 78 P.3d 232, 240 (Wyo. 2003).
21. See Meza-Cabrera, 2008 WL 376290, at *1.
22. Id. at *2.
23. Id.at *1.
24. Id.at *4.
25. See id. at * 1.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id. at *4.
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allegations of physical abuse, among other concerns. 28 Immediately upon the
child's removal from the home, Rosa was appointed an attorney who represented
her until the TPR hearing. 29 The attorney advocated for Rosa for over a year,
during which time the court adjudicated the child neglected, offered Rosa
30
During each of these
services, and determined the permanency plan for Elijah.
3
stages, she had the benefit of court-appointed counsel. 1
In October 2006, the State filed a petition requesting the termination of
Rosa's parental rights. 32 A court procedure required Rosa to fill out a form to
request counsel for the TPR hearing, but Rosa waited until the day before the
33
hearing to complete the form; the trial court denied the request as untimely.
She was unrepresented at the TPR hearing, and the court terminated her parental
rights. 34
These situations, which occur all too frequently in child welfare cases, share
important similarities. In both, parents were denied counsel at critical stages of
the case. 35 Important decisions that permanently altered the parents' relationship
with their children were made during the hearings, yet the parent had no
advocate.36 And in both situations, the appellate court reviewing the case
determined that the trial
court committed clear legal error in failing to appoint
37
counsel for the parent.
Yet, on appeal, the errors committed by the trial court were handled in
completely different ways. In Rosa's case, the appellate court summarily
reversed the decision to terminate her parental rights after finding legal error; the
court did not engage in a fact-based inquiry about the possible effects of the error
on the outcome of the case.38 However, in Mr. Meza-Cabrera's case, the
appellate court employed a very different approach. The Arkansas Court of
Appeals affirmed the termination of his parental rights despite the clear legal
error. 39 The court held that Mr. Meza-Cabrera had the burden of demonstrating
the precise impact of the error on the outcome of his case, and found that
because he had failed4 to do so, the nearly two-year erroneous deprivation of
counsel was harmless. 0

28. In re Interest of E.J.C., 731 N.W.2d 402, 403 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25, 32-34.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25, 32-34.
37. See Meza-Cabrera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 07-932, 2008 WL 376290, at
*4 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008); In re Interest of E.J.C., 731 N.W.2d at 404.
38. In re Interest ofE.J.C., 731 N.W.2d at 404.
39. Meza-Cabrera,2008 WL 376290, at *4.
40. See id.
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This Article argues that these two scenarios should be treated the same by
appellate courts. In both situations, there is no way for reviewing courts to
meaningfully ascertain the prejudice created by the trial court's error. Therefore,
the erroneous deprivation of counsel at critical stages in child protective cases
should always be treated as a structural error requiring automatic reversal of the
TPR decision.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the typical child welfare
case and demonstrates the myriad of ways in which decisions made during
earlier stages of the case impact the final TPR hearing. Part 1I discusses the
parental right to counsel, the basis for this right, and the role that counsel plays
in creating the record that is ultimately relied upon by the trial court prior to
making a TPR decision. Part III discusses some of the factors that may be
causing the erroneous denials of counsel by trial courts across the country, and
further explores the inadequacy of the current approach taken by appellate courts
to address the violations. Finally, Part IV argues that appellate courts should
view inappropriate denials of counsel at all hearings of the child welfare case as
structural errors requiring automatic reversal.
Before proceeding with the substantive arguments in this Article, one major
limitation applies. This Article sets forth a policy argument regarding the
appropriate remedy that appellate courts should apply when trial courts
erroneously deny counsel to parents in child protection cases. Unfortunately, in
a number of jurisdictions the absolute right to counsel in dependency and TPR
proceedings does not exist and thus trial courts, in their discretion, may properly
deny parents the assistance of an attorney. 41 Because the deprivation of counsel
would not constitute legal error in these states, the policy proposal suggested in
this Article-which involves the appropriate remedy for the erroneous
deprivation of counsel-would not be applicable.
1I.

THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS

Due to the fundamental right at stake-parents' right to direct the upbringing
of their child 42-child welfare cases are governed by federal and state laws that

41. See Vivek Sankaran, A National Survey on a Parent's Right to Counsel in Termination of
Parental Rights and Dependency Cases (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.
umich.edu/centersandprograms/ccl/specialprojects/Documents/Nationa%20Survey%20on%20a%2
OParent%27s%2ORight%20to%2OCounsel.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (surveying state statutes
and court rules providing for a parent's right to counsel in TPR and dependency hearings).
42. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course .. "); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Stanley v. Illinois,
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mandate strict procedural requirements.43 Cases begin with the filinz of a
petition containing allegations that a parent abused or neglected a child. The
petition may contain a request that a child be removed immediately, and if
removal is requested or has already occurred, a hearing must be held within
twenty-four to seventy-two hours to make initial decisions concerning the
authorization of the petition, immediate placement of the child, parenting time
between the child and the parent, and other issues.45 Parents are entitled to a full
trial to adjudicate the allegations in the petition against them, which in some
states may be before a jury.46 If the parent loses the trial or enters into a plea, the
court obtains jurisdiction over the child and the case moves to the dispositional
phase. 47
The first hearing after the adjudication trial is the dispositional hearing, at
which the court determines the placement of the child and, based on the reasons
for the adjudication, orders the parent and agency to comply with a case service
plan that outlines the steps required to reunite the family and bring the case to

closure. 48 Subsequent dispositional review hearings are held every three to six
months to review the child's placement, assess the parties' compliance with the
49 For
service plan, and determine whether any changes need to be made.
example, at each of these hearings, parents may request more extensive visitation
with their child, a different placement for their child, or additional services to

help them regain custody. 50 Similarly, the child welfare agency or prosecuting

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements."' (alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953) ("[A] mother's right to
custody of her children is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to
alimony.").
43. Over the past thirty years, the number of federal and state laws pertaining to the child
welfare system has increased significantly. For an overview of federal child welfare policy, see
Frank Vandervort, Federal Child Welfare Legislation, in CHILD WELFARE LAW & PRACTICE:
REPRESENTING

CHILDREN,

PARENTS,

AND

STATE

AGENCIES

IN

ABUSE,

NEGLECT,

AND

DEPENDENCY CASES 199 (Donald N. Duquette & Ann M. Haralambie eds., 2d ed. 2010). State
procedures vary considerably. The intent of this Part is to provide a basic summary of the process.
44. See, e.g., In re Interest of J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Ga. App. 2009) (noting that the case
began with the Department of Family and Children Services filing a petition that alleged the child
was deprived).
45. See Sue Badeau et al., A Child's Journey Through the Child Welfare System, in CHILD
WELFARE LAW & PRACTICE REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 213, 224 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette
eds., 2005).
46. E.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.911 (providing parties in a child protective case with the right to a
trial by jury); see Badeau et al., supra note 45, at 225.
47. See Badeau et al., supra note 45, at 226.
48. See id. at 226-28 ("'The case plan should outline the responsibilities of each party,
including what services the agency will provide and what is expected of the parents and child.").
49. Id. at 229-30.
50. See id. at 230.
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attorney may request that visits be terminated, that children remain in foster
care, 51 or that new services not be offered to parents because they are beyond the

scope of what the agency is obligated to provide. 52 Review hearings are
continuous in nature in the sense that each builds on decisions made at previous
hearings.53

If a child is under the supervision of the state and in foster care, federal law
requires a court of competent jurisdiction to convene a permanency planning
hearing "no later than 12 months after the date the child is considered to have
entered foster care" to determine the future plan for the child.54 At this hearing,
the court-based on documentary evidence, live testimony, and the arguments of
the parties-determines whether reunification remains a viable goal and, if not,
establishes an alternate goal which may include adoption, guardianship, or
another planned permanent living arrangement.55 Typically, the court makes this
determination based on the parent's progress, the needs of the child, and the
length of the child's stay in foster care.56 A parent's failure to comply with the
court ordered service plan is the predominant reason for a goal change in the
child welfare case, which can then result in the termination of services to reunify
the family. 57 Additionally, if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the
to
previous twenty-two months, federal law requires that the state file a petition
applies. 8

terminate parental rights, unless one of a number of exceptions
The filing of a TPR petition triggers additional procedural safeguards. The
parent is afforded a trial on the petition allegations, and the Constitution
mandates that the state prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence

51. See id.
52. See, e.g., In re G.G., 667 A.2d 1331, 1132-33, 1338 (D.C. 1995) (ruling that the trial
court lacked the authority to order a housing agency to provide immediate housing to parents ahead
of those on a waiting list so that a family could reunify).
53. See, e.g., In re LaFlure, 210 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("The purpose
of the review hearings provided for by the statute is to determine whether the parents of a child in
the temporary custody of the court have managed to 'reestablish' a fit home or are likely to do so
within the near future. We do not see how such a determination may be intelligently made unless
the court making the determination is fully aware of the circumstances which prompted placing the
child in the temporary custody of the court and of all subsequent circumstances, if any, which
prompted keeping the child in the temporary custody of the court .... Therefore, evidence admitted
at any one hearing is to be considered evidence in all subsequent hearings.").
54. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
55. See Badeau et al., supra note 45, at 230-31; see also MICH. CT. R. 3.976(D) ("At the
permanency planning hearing all relevant and material evidence, including oral and written reports,
may be received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value.").
56. See Badeu et al., supra note 45, at 231.
57. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 3.976(E) (noting that the "[f]ailure to substantially comply with
the case service plan" is evidence that the child may be in harm if returned to the parental home).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). States may opt not to file a petition to terminate parental rights if
the child is in a relative's care, the agency has documented a compelling reason that the termination
of parental rights would not be in the child's best interests, or if the state has not provided necessary
services to the family. Id.
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prior to permanently severing the parent-child relationship. 59 Most frequently,
the evidence introduced by the state at the TPR hearing consists of historical
information detailing the reasons why the child entered the foster care system
and the parent's compliance, or lack thereof, with the court ordered service

plan. 6° Orders and findings of fact from each review hearing are submitted into
evidence. 6t The overriding determinant in most cases is an assessment of the
parent's progress between the adjudication hearing and the TPR hearing. 62 If
parental rights are terminated, the child becomes a permanent
ward of the court
63
and "the parent becomes a 'legal stranger to the child.'
This cursory overview of the child welfare process demonstrates the

intertwined nature of the proceedings. What occurs at one hearing lays the
foundation for each subsequent hearing. 64 The facts proven at the adjudication
hearing provide the justification for the case service plan ordered at the
dispositional hearing. Evidence of the parent's and agency's willingness to
comply with the terms of the plan, which is reviewed at every hearing,
determines whether the child will come home or will enter another permanent
living arrangement. The events that
occur during the time when the plan
is in
....
66
effect constitute the primary evidence introduced at the TPR hearing. As the
Colorado Court of Appeals aptly observed:
Proceedings in dependency or neglect affect important rights so
there must be substantial compliance with statutory requirements for the

59. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) ("Before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the
State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.").
60. See id. at 762.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Barr v. Div. of Family Servs., 974 A.2d 88, 97-98 (Del. 2009) (terminating a
father's parental rights when evidence demonstrated, among other things, that he failed to comply
with his case plan).
63. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 562 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) ("When a court
orders termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and the child are severed forever,
and the parent becomes 'a legal stranger to the child."' (quoting Lowe v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of
Richmond, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 1986))), affd, 581 S.E.2d 213 (Va. 2003). But see Ex parte
M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1130 (Ala. 2009) (holding that parents can be held liable for child support
even after the termination of their parental rights).
64. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. See supra text accompanying note 48.
66. Hughes v. Div. of Family Servs., 836 A.2d 498, 507 (Del. 2003) ("We have
acknowledged that the factual basis for terminating parental rights is often the conduct that occurs
during the time frame between the commencement of a dependency and neglect proceeding and a
judicial determination that a termination proceeding is in the child's best interest."); White v. Dep't
of Rehab. Servs., 483 So. 2d 861, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("[D]ependency disposition
hearings and dependency disposition orders ... order the parents to enter into a performance
agreement which, when unperformed, leads directly to, and in combination with the adjudicated
facts underlying the original dependency petition and order, is the basis for, a later petition for
termination of parental rights.").
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conduct of those proceedings. The statutorily prescribed periodic
judicial review of an out-of-home placement proceeding is an important
proceeding to the parties. This is so because the trial court considers the
propriety of continued deprivation of custody, often together with the
parties' performance under the provisions of the court approved
treatment plan .... [T]hese proceedings may form a foundation for and
presage the filinf7 of a motion for termination of the parent-child legal
relationship ....
Because subsequent orders in the case are built upon earlier decisions, an
error that occurs at an early hearing can contaminate the entire case and can lead
to an erroneous termination of parental rights.
Consider the following
example. 68 A caseworker erroneously denies placement with relatives for a child
in foster care because of incorrect information about the relatives' criminal
history. The child instead enters the foster care of strangers and remains there
for several years. The relatives lack standing in the child protection case to raise
their concerns. At the TPR hearing, the parents assert that termination is not
warranted because the child could be, and should have been, placed with
relatives-an exception to the federal mandate requiring a termination petition
when a child has been in foster care for fifteen months. 69 The court, however,

67. People in Interest of J.B., 702 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. App. 1985) (citing People in Interest
of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of K.L., 681 P.2d 535, 536 (Colo.
App. 1984)); see also R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) ("Clearly,
the proceedings in a dependency action greatly affect any subsequent termination proceeding.
Indeed, in the case at bar, the cabinet changed its goal from returning A.J.V. to his parents to
permanent placement with his foster family. The district court approved that goal change. Although,
in theory, the goal could change again, back to reunification, it is clear that a district court's
approving adoption as a permanency goal significantly increases the risk that parental ties will be
severed."); In re D.M.K., 796 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) ("These initial hearings
allow the parties to become familiar with the parents' abilities and deficits, the child's needs, and
the efforts necessary for reunification. In a sense, the initial dispositional hearings form the
cornerstones of the succeeding review hearings, the permanency planning phase, and the ultimate
decision to terminate parental rights."); In re J.J.L., 223 P.3d 921, 924 (Mont. 2010) ("Adjudication
hearings 'must determine the nature of the abuse and neglect and establish facts that resulted in state
intervention and upon which disposition, case work, court review, and possible termination are
based."' (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-437(2) (2009))).
68. The following facts are somewhat similar to those in the case of In re McBride, in which
the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights even
though the incarcerated father was not afforded counsel at the final TPR hearing. No. 282062, 2008
WL 2751233, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 15, 2008) (per curiam). Dissenting from the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision not to review the case, Justice Corrigan discussed the trial court's failure
to place the children with relatives. Dep't of Human Servs. v. McBride (In re McBride), 766
N.W.2d 857, 858-59, 865 (Mich. 2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
69. Relative placement is of great importance in the TPR process. The federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act (ASFA) mandates that states file a TPR petition when a child has been in foster
care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). However, if
the state elects to place the child with a relative, the ASFA provides that the state is not required to
file a TPR proceeding. Id.
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rejects the argument stating that the child's best interests are not served by

moving her at the current time due to her bond with her foster parents. The
parents' rights are subsequently terminated due to the early error committed by

the worker. It is too late to right the wrong.
A second example illustrates this point as well.7 ° At a review hearing in the

case, the judge inappropriately engages in ex parte communications with a
teenager in foster care who tells the judge that she does not want to visit with her
mother. During the meeting, the child does not reveal that she is angry with her

mother because of her removal from the home. Based on the in camera
interview, the judge summarily suspends visitation without making a finding that
visitation would harm the child, as required by the statute. No "reasonable
efforts ' 71 are made to address the child's discomfort with the visits, and the child
and parent do not see each other for the entire duration of the case. Frustrated by
the fact that she has not seen her child in several years, the mother does not show
up to the final TPR hearing.

At the hearing, the court makes a finding that termination is in the child's
best interests solely because the child probably wants her mother's rights
terminated since they have no relationship. 72 The court also notes the mother's

absence from the hearing in its findings. The erroneous termination of visits,
based on the improper conversations between the judge and the child, and the
failure to make efforts to maintain the parent-child relationship at the outset of
the case, all preordained the findings made by the judge at the final TPR hearing.

These examples are intended to illustrate a very basic point. Errors in child
protective proceedings have a compounding effect since all future decisions
73
build upon each finding and order made at prior hearings. Errors such as an
unnecessary removal, an unexplored relative placement, an inappropriate
suspension of visits, or a false allegation of substance abuse or mental illness

affect both short and long-term decisions in the case, the parties' involvement in

70. These facts are based on the case of In re S.LS., in which the Michigan Court of Appeals
found that the trial court erred in engaging in ex parte communications with a child subject to the
child protective proceeding. No. 294286, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 973, at *2-3 (Mich. Ct. App.
May 25, 2010).
71. Under the ASFA, state child welfare agencies must make "reasonable efforts" to reunify
children with their parents unless specific exceptions apply. § 671(a)(15)(B). The failure to make
such efforts can excuse a state from having to file a mandatory petition to terminate parental rights
where the child has been in foster care for fifteen months. See § 675(5)(E).
72. In re S.LS., 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 973, at *14-16 (Gleicher, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mason (In re Mason), 782 N.W.2d 747, 753, 761
(Mich. 2010) (finding that the child welfare agency's errors deprived the father of the right to
participate in review hearings and required reversal, noting that "the court and the DHS were ready
to move on to the termination hearing" because the father "missed the crucial, year-long review
period during which the court was called upon to evaluate the [father's] efforts and decide whether
reunification of the children with their parents could be achieved"); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of
Multnomah Cnty. v. Grannis (In re Grannis), 680 P.2d 660, 665 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) ("There is some
possibility that the findings and disposition will affect [the] mother's interests in future proceedings
in this case and in ancillary proceedings.").
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the case plan, and the relationships between parents and children. If errors are
made during earlier hearings, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to assess
the precise impact of an earlier error at the time of the final TPR hearing because
Thus,
that error may have affected the entire direction of the case.
all
have
and
commentators
courts,
state
policymakers,
unsurprisingly,
emphasized the important role that parents' counsel play, especially early in a
child welfare case, to reduce the likelihood that this type of contamination will
occur. The next section discusses this role.
III. THE CRUCIAL ROLE PARENTS' COUNSEL PLAY IN PREVENTING ERRONEOUS
TERMINATIONS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

In 1981, the United States Supreme Court, in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham County,74 held that the Constitution does not
automatically confer the assistance of court appointed counsel to indigent parents
facing the termination of their parental rights.75 Instead, the Court instructed
trial courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether counsel is
constitutionally mandated.76 At the end of the opinion, the Court offered this
guidance to states:
A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards be
adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.
Informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental
termination proceedings, but also in dependency and neglect
proceedings as well.77

For the most part, states have followed this guidance. The overwhelming
majority of states provide indigent parents with the right to appointed counsel
either through statute, court rule, or the state's constitution. 78 At least forty-four
states provide parents with an absolute right to counsel in TPR proceedings and
at least thirty-eight states offer parents an attorney at public expense whenever
the state seeks to remove children from their care. 79 Best practices would likely

74. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
78. See Sankaran, supra note 41.
79. See id.; see also Astra Outley, Representationfor Children and Parents in Dependency
Proceedings,THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 7 (June 1, 2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foster care-reform/Representation[2].pdf (observing that thirtynine states provide counsel for indigent parents).
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support providing parents80with counsel immediately after the state files a petition
alleging abuse or neglect.
Parents' attorneys play a pivotal role in these cases. Similar to criminal
defense attorneys, they protect their clients from unjust accusations, ensure that
parents receive due process protections, and help to ensure that the entire judicial
process affords families a fair opportunity to take advantage of its protections
and services. 81 Like attorneys in other contexts, parents' lawyers assist courts in
properly adjudicating historical facts.8 2
However, unlike lawyers in other contexts, parents' counsel also help to
create the record that the court relies upon in making future decisions.8 3 In
situations where temporary removal occurs, advocacy by parents' counsel can
expedite the safe reunification of the family by facilitating the prompt delivery of
appropriate services to the family, by advocating for extensive visitation between
the parent and the child, and by counseling parents about the ramifications of the
84
choices they must make, which may increase compliance with court directives.
Parents' lawyers also participate in administrative meetings with caseworkers,
85
where significant decisions are made about the services offered to parents.
And in situations where the parent is unable to care for the child, the parent's
lawyer can serve the client by arranging for another temporary or permanent
legal placement, such as a guardianship, which will advance the parent's
86
interests. In these and other ways, attorneys for parents can dramatically affect
the outcome of a child welfare case.
Statistics corroborate the enormous impact parents' attorneys can have in a
case. A study conducted by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges found that improved parent legal representation increased reunifications
by over 50%, decreased the rate of termination of parental rights by almost 45%,

80.

William G. Jones, Working with the Courts in Child Protection, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH

& HUMAN SERVS., 27 (2006), http:llwww.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/courts/courts.pdf.
The Detroit Center for Family Advocacy, the Vermont Parent Representation Center, Inc., and the
Center for Family Representation, Inc. in New York City are three organizations that provide
representation for parents prior to the filing of a petition. See generally Detroit Center for Family
Advocacy, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ccl/cfa
/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2011); Why VPRC is Important to Vermont Families, VT.
PARENT REPRESENTATION CTR., INC., http://www.vtprc.org/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 2, 2011);
Bringing Innovative Legal Services to Scale, THE CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, INC.,
http://www.cfrny.org/new-legal.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
81. See Richard Cozzola & Andrya Soprych, Representing Parents in Civil Child Protection
Cases, FAM. ADVOC., Winter 2009, at 22; Frank Vandervort & Vivek Sankaran, Mich. State Court
Admin. Office, Parents' Attorney Protocol, MICH. COURTs, 2-3 (July 2008), http://courts.michigan.
gov/scao/resources/standards/PAP.pdf; Vivek S. Sankaran, Representing Parents in Child Welfare
Cases, in CHILD WELFARE LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 579.
82. Cozzola & Soprych, supra note 81, at 22.
83. See id.
84. See Vandervort & Sankaran, supra note 81, at 23-25, 27-28, 45-48 (citations omitted).
85. See infra note 149.
86. Vandervort & Sankaran, supra note 81, at 3.
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and expedited the court process significantly. 87 Similarly, clients served by the

Center for Family Representation
...
.. in New York City-a88groundbreaking
nonprofit law and policy organization advocating for parents 8-reunited with
their children in foster care within just over four months, compared to the
statewide average of nearly three years.8 9 Therefore, as these statistics
demonstrate, strong advocacy on behalf of parents furthers the best9 interests of

children and improves outcomes for both children and their families. 0
The crucial role that parents' counsel play in all stages of a child welfare
case has been well-documented in state and national standards of practice,
articles, and court opinions, among other sources. For example, the Standards of
Practice for Attorneys Representing Parents in Abuse and Neglect Cases

adopted by the American Bar Association urge courts to "[e]nsure [that]
appointments are made when a case first comes before the court, or before the
first hearing, and last until the case has been dismissed from the court's
jurisdiction." 91 The highly regarded Resources Guidelines issued by the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges emphasizes that

"[b]ecause of the critical strategic importance of the preliminary protective
hearing, it is essential that parents have meaningful legal representation at the
hearing. ' 92 And the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care concludes that
"[t]o safeguard children's best interests.., children and their parents must have
a direct voice in court,93 effective representation, and the timely input of those
who care about them."

87. Jason A. Oetjen, Nat'l Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Improving Parents'
Representation in Dependency Cases: A Washington State Pilot Program Evaluation, WASH.
STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., 6-7 (Aug. 2003), http://opd.wa.gov/Reports/dependency%20&%20
Termination %20Reports/watabriefcolorfinal%5B 1%5D.pdf.
88. See generally CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, INC., http://www.cfmy.
org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
89. See 2009 Nonprofit Accomplishments, CTR. FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION, INC., http://
www.cfmy.org/2009-accomp.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
90. See Bobbe J. Bridge & Joanne I. Moore, Implementing Equal Justice for Parents in
Washington: A Dual Approach, JUv. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 2002, at 40 ("Improving equal justice for
parents serves our judicial system's value of fairness as well as both the spirit and letter of our
dependency and termination laws.").
91. Standardsof Practicefor Attorneys Representing Parents in Abuse and Neglect Cases,
A.B.A., 7, http://www.abanet.org/child/clp/ParentStds.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2011). These
standards were promulgated "with the help of a committee of practicing parents' attorneys and child
welfare professionals from different jurisdictions in the country." Id. at 1.
92. PUBL'N DEV. COMM., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 34
(1995).
93. The Pew Comm'n on Children in Foster Care, Fosteringthe Future: Safety, Permanence
and Well-Being for Children in Foster Care, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 18 (2004),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorglReportslFoster care-reform/foster-care
_final_051804.pdf.
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Courts have made similar observations. For example, in Watson v. Division
of Family Services,94 the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that "[i]f an
attorney is only appointed to represent an indigent parent after the petition to
terminate has been filed then the outcome is almost inevitable." 95 Similarly, in
R. V. v. Commonwealth Departmentfor Health and Family,96 the Kentucky Court

of Appeals observed that the "termination proceeding was incurably tainted by
the failure of the district court to provide counsel for the parents at all critical
stages of the underlying dependency proceeding." 97 And in the case of In re
Hudson,98 in which the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a TPR decision
because, among other things, the trial court failed to appoint counsel for the
mother in a timely manner, 9 Justice Maura Corrigan's concurring opinion
articulated the ways in which the earlier appointment of counsel could have
affected the case. Justice Corrigan wrote:
[C]ounsel for respondent could have challenged the evidence presented
by the DHS and could have called and cross-examined the individuals
who prepared the many reports DHS witnesses referenced in their
testimony at these hearings. Instead, once these proceedings were set in
motion by respondent's invalid plea, the DHS was allowed to present
unchallenged hearsay evidence, including the results of respondent's
drug screenings, psychologists' reports pertaining to respondent and the
children, and statements of respondent's therapist, through the testimony
of DHS workers. Other witnesses did not appear at the hearings. No
one was subjected to cross-examination. The DHS built a record of
respondent's failed drug tests and struggles to maintain employment and
appropriate housing over the course of more than two years, while
respondent never challenged the veracity of that evidence or offered any
evidence of her own. By the time counsel was appointed to represent
respondent two weeks before the termination trial, the DHS had built an
extensive record against respondent, and there was little counsel could
do to remedy the harm. 100

94. 813 A.2d ll01 (Del. 2002).
95. Id. at 1106; see also Fresno Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lucia R. (In re Ronald R.), 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 29 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is at [the permanency hearing], and not at the subsequent
section 366.26 hearing, that the critical decision regarding parental rights is made.").
96. 242 S.W.3d 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
97. Id. at 673.
98. 763 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 2009).
99. Id. at 619.
100. Id. at 625-26 (footnote omitted); see also In re Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009
WL 2998116, at *14 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2009) (expressing deep concern about parents being
"thrown, without representation, into the complex and fast-paced environment of statutes, rules,
case plans, and time-critical rehabilitation efforts that are the focus of juvenile-protection
proceedings").
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It is evident that best practices in child welfare cases mandate the early

appointment of counsel and that, for the most part, states have responded by
guaranteeing this right to indigent parents. But, as the next section details, this is
not only a key procedural right often violated by trial courts, but appellate courts
have consistently excused the violations-thereby encouraging them to occurby reviewing the error using a harmless error analysis, a nearly insurmountable
burden for aggrieved parents to meet.
IV. A HOLLOW RIGHT
One studying state statutes and court rules guaranteeing parents the right to
counsel in child welfare cases may optimistically conclude that the right is being
adequately implemented. Yet, as is often the case, reality tells a far different
story. Despite strong pronouncements about the importance of a parent's right to

counsel by state policymakers, jurists, and commentators, 10 1 successful
implementation of the procedural right has escaped our reach. Nationally,°2
attorneys representing parents are woefully underpaid and overworked.
Systemic inadequacies exemplified by low compensation, high caseloads and
poor training have drawn the ire of state and national groups and have been the
subject of litigation. 103 Most recently, the American

Bar Association convened a
national group to focus on improving the representation
of parents in child

101. See supra Part II.
102. See C-HLDREN'S JUSTICE INITIATIVE PARENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION WORKGROUP,
REPORT OF CHILDREN'S JUSTICE INITIATIVE PARENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION WORKGROUP To
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/
other/090151.pdf ("There is no statewide funding and no standards of practice for attorneys
representing parents."); Joe Sexton, As Courts Remove Children, Lawyers for Parents Stumble,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at Al (describing court appointed lawyers as "overburdened and ill
equipped"); Editorial, Giving Overmatched Parents a Chance, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1996, at A14
("[Plarents are generally stuck with harried court-appointed lawyers who are juggling many cases,
and who often show up unprepared and late for hearings."); Appellate Div. First Dep't Comm. on
Representation of the Poor, Crisis in the Legal Representation of the Poor, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED
COURT SYS. (Mar. 23, 2001), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/old-keep/lad-rep-poor.shtml
("As a result of shamefully low rates of compensation of assigned counsel, lack of resources,
support and respect, inadequate funding of institutional providers, combined with ever-increasing
caseloads, New York's poor are too often not being afforded the 'meaningful and effective'
representation to which they are entitled .... ); Outley, supra note 79, at 8 ("Most attorneys for
parents receive either a low hourly rate or a small flat fee per case."); The Spangenberg Group,
Western Massachusetts Child Welfare Cases: The Court-Appointed Counsel System in Crisis,
COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS., 3 (Oct. 20, 2003), http://www.publiccounsel.net/practiceareas/
cafl-pages/pdf/caflnews/executive summary.pdf ("Low compensation is a primary factor
contributing to declining interest in court-appointed work.").
103. See supra note 102; see also N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376,
388-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (granting permanent preliminary injunction raising fees for courtappointed lawyers after concluding that the evidence demonstrated that the low compensation rate
resulted in "backlogs," "case overload," and "prolonged delays").
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welfare cases. 1° 4 Policymakers, judges, and other interested parties have decried
the status quo and have pushed for systemic reforms to address these

inadequacies.

0 5 The

deficiency of parents' counsel is certainly a major issue that

needs to be addressed. 106

Another serious problem is that frequently, attorneys for parents are simply
not present at hearings in which parents are legally entitled to counsel. This is
not an isolated phenomenon. Repeatedly, appellate courts have found that trial
courts committed legal error by proceeding forward in earlier child protective

hearings and termination of parental rights proceedings without affording parents
the assistance of counsel.107

Several factors may explain why this is occurring. Because no absolute
federal constitutional or statutory right 10 8 to counsel exists, the funding decision
for parent representation is left entirely to the states. Many states, despite having
enacted strong statutes requiring counsel for parents at all stages of the case, pass
along the costs for compensating parents' attorneys onto counties.1°9 County

104. See About the Project, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/child-law/projectsinitiatives/parentrepresentation.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) ("The National Project to Improve
Representation for Parents Involved in the Child Welfare System aims to strengthen representation
of parents in the child welfare system.").
105. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009 WL 2998116, at *14 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 2009) (expressing deep concern about a system that leaves parents unrepresented in
juvenile-protection proceedings).
106. See, e.g., MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV. & AM. BAR ASS'N, MICHIGAN COURT
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT REASSESSMENT 153 (2005), available at http://www.courts.michigan.

gov/scao/resources/publications/reports/CrPReassessmentReport090605.pdf (noting that attorneys
must maintain high caseload numbers to assure themselves adequate income). The report further
states that parents reported that:
Their attorneys do not return phone calls or provide parents with their phone numbers, do
not explain what is going on in their cases, do not give parents a chance to tell their side
of the story at court hearings, and make deals without consulting with them. Parents
describe talking to their attorneys for only a few minutes before their hearings.
Id. at 154.
107. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (listing cases in which appellate courts
held that trial courts committed legal error by proceeding with a case when the parent was not
represented by counsel).
108. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (holding that the United States
Constitution does not afford parents an absolute right to counsel in termination of parental rights
cases). But see 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2006) (requiring states to provide children with a
guardian ad litem "who may be an attorney" in child abuse or neglect cases if receiving grant aid
under this section).
109. See,

e.g.,

CHILDREN'S

JUSTICE

INITIATIVE

PARENT

LEGAL

REPRESENTATION

WORKGROUP, supra note 102, at 2 ("There is no statewide funding and no standards of practice for
attorneys representing parents. Instead, it is currently left to each county to decide whether they
will pay for court-appointed legal representation for parents; what amount to pay attorneys; and
what minimal practice standards to impose, if any."); CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, AM. BAR
ASS'N, LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS: A
PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN'S PRACTICE 4 (2009), available at http://courts.
michigan.gov/scao/resources/publications/reports/2009ABAParentRepresentationReport.pdf
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governments have struggled to comply with these unfunded mandates."i 0
Historically, both state and county governments have not allocated enough funds
to ensure that parents receive zealous representation.l"'
Problems associated with the underfunding of the system have manifested
themselves in a myriad ways. Some courts have explicitly refused to appoint
counsel for parents because of a shortage of money. For example, a trial court in
Arkansas explained to a parent that "funding for appointed counsel had been
reduced" and told the parent to wait until the next hearing to see whether counsel
could be appointed for her." 2 Others have simply ignored valid requests made
by parents, I 13 have denied requests based on parents' failure to comply with
technical requirements, like filling out the right form," 4 or have failed to advise
parents that the statutory right even exists." Presumably, one reason why trial
courts may take these procedural shortcuts is to save money.
Even when trial courts are willing to expend the funds to compensate
parents' counsel, they may be unable to locate anyone willing to take the case for

("Michigan places the burden of funding parent representation on its counties, without structural
support from the state.").
110. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S JUSTICE INITIATIVE PARENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION
WORKGROUP, supra note 102, at 6-7 (noting the ways that counties have dealt with the payment of

court-appointed attorneys and stating that some counties have simply refused to pay for courtappointed attorneys even when ordered to do so).
111. See, e.g., id. (noting that since counties have inherited the responsibility of paying for
court-appointed lawyers, many of those counties have struggled to find qualified attorneys to
represent parents in child protection cases due to funding issues).
112. Farmer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 06-185, 2006 WL 2879454, at *1 (Ark.
Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2006); see also In re Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009 WL 2998116, at
*13-14 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2009) (stating that parents were without counsel for three and a
half months and noting concern for possible systemic effects that could result from lack of parental
representation caused by inadequate funding).
113. See Wilkinson v. Thornton (In re K.L.T.), 237 S.W.3d 605, 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (per
curiam) (noting that despite the father's request the trial court failed to appoint counsel); In re
T.C.B., No. 08-02-00515-CV, 2003 WL 21810958, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2003) (noting that
the trial court failed to respond to the father's request for appointed-counsel).
114. See In re Interest of E.J.C., 731 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the
district court denied the mother's request for a court-appointed attorney because the district court
deemed the request untimely); Juvenile Office of Mo. v. Schmidt (In re N.S.), 77 S.W.3d 655, 65657 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that the trial court denied the father's first request for counsel
because father failed to "fill in every blank on the application"); Little v. Little, 487 S.E.2d 823, 824
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the trial court found that since the mother "had not filed an answer
or any other pleading and had not previously asked for an attorney, she had waived the right to court
appointed counsel by her lack of action").
115. E.g., T.B. v. State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. (In re Interest of J.B.), 624 So.
2d 792, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the mother was not advised of her right to
counsel at the dependency hearing); In re Christopher C., 499 A.2d 163, 164 (Me. 1985) (finding
that the mother was never apprised of her right to appointed counsel if indigent); Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Dick (In re Keifer), 406 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ('The referee did not
advise respondent of his right to an attorney and none was appointed.").
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low rates of compensation.' 16 For example, the New York Times observed that
"up to 50 parents [were] sent home each week because no lawyer [was]
available" in New York City, and that the number of attorneys willing to take
these cases was cut in half in a ten year period. 117 More recently, in Minnesota,
budget cuts to the public defender's office forced the statewide office to stop
representing parents in child welfare proceedings, leaving many parents without
Given the low payment rate, it is unsurprising that few
legal representation.'
attorneys would choose to do this work.
Locating an attorney willing to take a court appointment is not a guarantee
that the attorney will show up at court hearings. Due to the low compensation
rates, parents' attorneys often maintain high caseloads and frequently schedule
multiple hearings at the same time. 119 When faced with scheduling conflicts,
120
attorneys may try to arrange for substitute counsel to appear on their behalf 121
and if they cannot find one, they may choose not to attend the hearing.
Appellate case law shows many examples of parents who are unrepresented at
hearings because their lawyers simply failed to appear. 22 And due to the
demands to proceed expeditiously in child welfare cases, driven by federal and
state requirements 23 and the scheduling demands of multiple parties, courts

116. See CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, supra note 109, at 92-95 (detailing compensation
rates for parents' attorneys in Michigan); Carla Crowder, Exodus of Lawyers for Kids Feared, THE
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 21, 2005, at 13A ("Without overhead pay, [court-appointed attorneys]
essentially are making $5 to $10 an hour on some cases.").
117. David Rohde, Critical Shortage of Lawyers for Poor Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999,
§ 1, at 59.
118. See CHILDREN'S JUSTICE INITIATIVE PARENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION WORKGROUP,
supra note 102, at 2 ("As a result of the recent decision of the Board of Public Defense to cease
representation of parents ... there is no longer a statewide process to appoint qualified attorneys to
represent parents .... ); In re Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009 WL 2998116, at *14 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2009) (observing that parents were without counsel due to a budget crisis).
119. See, e.g., Sweetin v. State (In re S.S.), 90 P.3d 571, 574 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (noting
that the mother's attorney had two trials scheduled for the same time and informed the court that the
mother's trial was the "non-priority case").
120. See, e.g., MUSKIE SCH. OF PUB. SERV. & AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 106, at 153 (noting
that attorneys' high caseloads "contribute to the necessity [for] substitute" counsel to appear on their
behalf).
121. See supra note 119.
122. See Dep't of Human Servs. v. Craven (In re Perri), No. 280156, 2008 WL 1991736, at *5
(Mich. Ct. App. May 8, 2008) (per curiam) (stating that "the record reveals no reason for [retained
counsel's] failure to attend" the court hearing); In re Interest of J.S.W., 295 S.W.3d 877, 881 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that even though the mother had court-appointed counsel in the
beginning of the proceedings, "[a]t no time did the court make an inquiry or even an entry on the
record concerning Mother's lack of representation at the multiple proceedings that took place
subsequent to the initial adjudication"); In re S.S., 90 P.3d at 574 (noting that the mother's attorney
failed to appear at the hearing because she had a jury trial set in another county at the same time).
123. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006) (requiring the trial court to schedule a
permanency planning hearing within twelve months of a child's entry into foster care).
Additionally, under this statute states generally must file a petition to terminate a parent's rights if a
child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months. § 675(5)(E).
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often feel pressured to go forward with the case without the presence of the

parent's counsel rather than adjourn the hearing to a later date. 124
Court-appointed counsel may also be missing from the hearings because
courts inappropriately discharge them. This often occurs when a parent fails to
attend a court hearing or refuses to comply with a case service-lan, which some
trial courts have interpreted to evince a disinterest in the case.

Again, funding

considerations may come into play when these situations arise, as trial courts
may feel constrained to save county and state funds whenever possible. A court
may believe that a parent who does not appear at a hearing does not deserve a
taxpayer-supported lawyer, even though the statute may require otherwise.
These explanations provide a glimpse into some of the reasons why parents'
counsel may be absent during critical stages of a child welfare case.
Unfortunately, appellate courts, for the most part, have responded by condoning
these legal errors. 126 Reviewing courts have repeatedly excused trial courts of
mistakes involving the early appointment of counsel so long as counsel is
subsequently appointed to represent the parent at the final TPR hearing.127 As

124. E.g., A.P. v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (demonstrating a
trial court's decision to go forward on a termination of parental rights hearing even though courtappointed counsel could not be present on the first day due to inclement weather); In re S.S., 90
P.3d at 574 (illustrating a trial court going forward on a TPR hearing even though the mother's
attorney had a jury trial scheduled for the same time in a different county).
125. See Fresno Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lucia R. (In re Ronald R.), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22,
24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the trial court permitted the attorney to withdraw because the
mother was not present at the hearing, and the court did not thereafter appoint substitute counsel);
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shabazz (In re Shabazz), No. 286130, 2009 WL 325316, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 10, 2009) (per curiam) ("It is undisputed that respondent's attorney was discharged
without explanation after a dispositional review hearing and that respondent was without an
attorney for several months, including at the permanency planning hearing where proofs were
taken."); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hall (In re Hall), 469 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(explaining that the trial court discharged the attorney because he did not know his client's
whereabouts); State v. R.M. (In re Interest of N.M.), 484 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Neb. 1992) (stating that
the lower court permitted the appointed attorney to withdraw because the attorney and the client
"did not get along generally," and that the court failed to appoint a substitute attorney); In re Alyssa
C., 790 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the trial court permitted the attorney to
withdraw because the mother had not contacted the lawyer for more than six months); People ex rel.
Dep't of Soc. Servs, 691 N.W.2d 586, 588-89 (S.D. 2004) (stating that the trial court failed to
appoint new counsel for the parent after allowing the previous attorney to withdraw following
conflicts with the parent); In re Welfare of G.E., 65 P.3d 1219, 1222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (noting
that the lower court allowed an attorney to withdraw without stating any reasons for the
withdrawal); State v. Shirley E. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Torrance P., Jr.), 724
N.W.2d 623, 627 (Wis. 2006) (noting that the circuit court discharged a court-appointed attorney
over the attorney's objection because the client failed to show at court hearings); State v. Patti P. (In
re Termination of Parental Rights to Phillip E.), No. 2007AP324, 2007 WL 2769400, at *2 (Wis.
Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007) (explaining that the trial court permitted an attorney to withdraw in the
middle of a termination of parental rights hearing because the mother did not appear at the hearing).
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Briscoe v. State, Dep't of Human Servs., 912 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ark. 1996)
("[T]he error of failing to provide counsel in earlier hearings was cured by the provision of counsel
in the final hearing .... ).
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noted at the outset of this Article, in situations where a parent is erroneously
deprived of counsel at the final TPR hearing, appellate courts have been steadfast

in automatically reversing the TPR decision regardless of the merits of the
case. 28 The parent's culpability is irrelevant because the erroneous deprivation
of counsel at any part of that final hearing undermines the integrity of the entire
process. Thus, appellate courts are deprived of any reliable way of assessing the

harm caused by the denial of counsel. 129 Cases involving parents with lengthy
periods of incarceration, serious substance abuse issues, and extensive mental
health issues have all been overturned because of the trial court's failure to
appoint counsel at the TPR hearing.'

30

Factors such as a parent's failure to

attend court hearings, refusal to remain in touch with his court-appointed
counsel, or repeated requests to fire his attorney have been deemed to be
irrelevant to the court's decision to reverse a TPR determination.' 31 The

128. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., In re Interest of J.M.B., 676 S.E.2d 9, 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) ("[Tlhe total and
erroneous denial of appointed counsel during the termination hearing is presumptively harmful
because it calls into question the very structural integrity of the fact-finding process." (citing Nix v.
Dep't of Human Res., 225 S.E.2d 306, 307-08 (Ga. 1976))); A.P. v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W.3d
418, 421 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) ("We cannot say that the failure of the mother's counsel to be present
on the scheduled day of the trial during the testimony of the first two witnesses made no difference
in the family court termination proceeding."); In re S.S., 90 P.3d at 577 ("We find that parental
rights are too precious to be terminated without the full panoply of protections afforded by the
Oklahoma Constitution." (quoting A.E. v. State, 743 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Okla. 1987))); In re
Termination of ParentalRights to Torrance P., Jr., 724 N.W.2d at 635 ("Depriving a parent of the
statutory right to counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding deprives the parent of a
basic protection without which, according to our legislature, a termination of parental rights
proceeding cannot reliably serve its function.
The fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceeding... has been placed in doubt when the statutory right to counsel is denied a parent.").
130. See, e.g., In re Interest of A.J., 604 S.E.2d 635, 636-37 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (incarcerated
father serving a fifty year sentence in prison for aggravated child molestation); In re Interest of
E.J.C., 731 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (mother with "borderline intellectual
functioning"); In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 568-69, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (evidence
demonstrated that mother had mental illness, did not produce any documents that she was under
psychiatric care, did not complete parenting training, and did not contribute monetary support for
her child); In re Welfare of G.E., 65 P.3d 1219, 1221, 1226 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the
father "minimally complied with the court-ordered services" to address problems of substance
abuse); In re Termination of ParentalRights to TorranceP., Jr., 724 N.W.2d at 625 (noting that the
child was born with "cocaine in his system, to parents who... were frequently in trouble with the
law and were incarcerated at various times. During the first five years of his life, [the child] was
shuttled between relatives, neighbors, and foster care in at least three different states[,] . . . [and he]
witnessed his parents abuse each other verbally and physically.").
131. See, e.g., Daniel Y. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 77 P.3d 55, 56, 60-61 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (reversing a TPR decision due to the lower court's denial of the right to counsel even though
the parent essentially forced his retained attorney and two subsequent court appointed attorneys to
withdraw from representation due to irreconcilable differences); In re Interest of J.S.W., 295
S.W.3d 877, 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (mother had not seen her child in seven months at the time of
the TPR hearing); Little v. Little, 487 S.E.2d 823, 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (mother in jail made no
effort to contact anyone); State v. Patti P. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Phillip E.), No.
2007AP324, 2007 WL 2769400, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007) (child born addicted to
cocaine and mother incarcerated throughout the entirety of the case).
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reasoning of these decisions is clear-because the precise effect of the harm
cannot be gleaned, automatic reversal is the only appropriate remedy for such a
serious violation. 132
Yet, a very different approach is taken when the erroneous deprivation of
counsel occurs at an earlier stage of the case as long as counsel is provided to the
parent at that final TPR hearing. In these situations, many appellate courts have
forced litigants to demonstrate that the specific harm caused the earlier denial of
counsel, which is a very difficult burden to sustain.133 The parent must show
"what arguments he would have advanced, what evidence he would have
produced in his favor, or how he would have been successful had he been
represented by counsel."' 34
This type of harmless error analysis requires appellate courts to delve deeply
into the merits of the TPR case. In these cases, appellate courts wrestle with a
variety of questions. How strong was the state's case against the parent? How
would the earlier appointment of counsel have changed the course of the case?
Was the parent deprived of a defense to the TPR? Would the earlier
appointment of counsel have made a determinative difference in the case? To
succeed on appeal, the parent must prove that the result of the case would have

been different had the court appointed the attorney at the correct stage of the
case. 135 Few parents have been able to meet this insurmountable burden.

132. See, e.g., In re Termination of ParentalRights to Torrance P.,Jr., 724 N.W.2d at 635
("We thus hold that it was prejudicial error per se for the circuit court to dismiss [the parent's]
attorney from the proceedings ....).
133. See cases cited supra note 20 and accompanying text.
134. See In re Interest of M.S., 630 S.E.2d 856, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006), disapproved on
other grounds, 676 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
135. See Meza-Cabrera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 07-932, 2008 WL 376290, at
*4 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) ("[H]e has not demonstrated how the termination proceeding
would have differed had he had the benefit of counsel ....); Farmer v. Ark. Dep't of Human
Servs., No. CA 06-185, 2006 WL 2879454, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2006) ("[H]er lack of
argument as to how she was prejudiced or that the outcome of the case would have been different if
counsel had been appointed earlier, make it impossible for this court to reverse the trial court's
decision."); Fresno Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lucia R. (In re Ronald R.), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 30
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("[The mother] has not shown that the presence of counsel would have resulted
in a different outcome ....); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shabazz (In re Shabazz), No. 286130, 2009
WL 325316, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2009) (per curiam) ("Respondent has failed to show that
he was harmed by the fact that he was unrepresented prior to the termination hearings."); MN v.
State Dep't of Family Servs. (In re Interest of MN), 78 P.3d 232, 240 (Wyo. 2003) ('The record
does not reflect that Mother was prejudiced or injured by the failure to appoint her counsel at the
initial juvenile proceeding.").
136. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.A.W., No. A09-0517, 2009 WL 2998116, at *13-14 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009) (affirming the termination of the parents' rights because, while the parents'
right to counsel was violated, this error did not prejudice them). The approach taken by the
Minnesota court in In re Welfare of S.A. W. is illustrative of the difficulties parents have in meeting
this standard. In handing down its ruling, the court noted that it was "not holding that [the]
appellants would not have benefited from legal representation during the period in question" and
that it was "deeply concerned" that parents were being "thrown, without representation, into the
complex and fast-paced environment of statutes, rules, case plans, and time-critical rehabilitation
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Given the interconnected nature of child welfare proceedings-in which
what occurs in prior proceedings lays the foundation for future decisions37-this
two-tiered approach of appellate review makes little sense. The inconsistent
standards display a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that attorneys play
at earlier hearings to create the evidence that is subsequently at issue during a
TPR hearing and the defense available to parents.138
V.

THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM

The fundamental flaw in applying a harmless error analysis when evaluating
erroneous deprivations of counsel in child welfare cases is that litigants will

never be able to show the precise harm caused by the trial court's error. This is
so because the failure to appoint counsel when legally required contaminates the

entire record in a way that precludes meaningful appellate review. No reliable
method of ascertaining harm exists.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the inappropriateness of
employing a harmless error analysis when confronted with a denial of the right
to counsel in criminal cases.1 39 The Court has regarded the error as a structural

one because "a pervasive denial of counsel casts such doubt on the fairness of
the trial process, that it can never be considered harmless error."' 140 The
deprivation "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,"' 14' and in
the absence of basic due process protections, such as the right to counsel, a "trial
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination142of guilt or
innocence" and the result cannot be viewed "as fundamentally fair."'
The rationale supporting an automatic reversal rule for the denial of counsel
is even stronger in the context of child welfare proceedings where attorneys play

efforts that are the focus of juvenile-protection proceedings." Id. The court further noted that "the
aggregate effect of a systemic failure to provide counsel to parents like appellants threatens to
seriously impair the rights of parents, the rights of children, and, in the unfortunate cases where
those rights conflict, the legal system's ability to strike a just balance between those rights." Id. at
*14. Yet, despite these pronouncements, the court still affirmed the termination of the parents'
rights. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying note 53.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
139. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
140. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988) (emphasis added) (citing Satterwhite v. Texas,
486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988)); see also Imperial Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Maria F. (In re Michelle
C.), 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 125, 138-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]here are some errors that go to the
fundamental fairness of the underlying process and which, by their very nature, undermine the
safeguards otherwise presumed to exist in our judicial system. When such an error occurs, reversal
is required regardless of the outcome, because we cannot say that the proceeding itself was fair.");
State v. Shirley E. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Torrance P., Jr.), 724 N.W.2d 623, 635
(Wis. 2006) ("A harmless error analysis is not applied in a criminal case because counsel is critical
to a fair trial and no one can reliably determine the level of prejudice arising from the denial of a
right to counsel.").
141. Arizona v. Fulininante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
142. Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).

HeinOnline -- 63 S. C. L. Rev. 35 2011-2012

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63:13

a critical role in not only challenging the state's evidence at the TPR hearing, but
also in helping to create and shape that evidence during the many hearings that
occur prior to that final hearing. During the earlier hearings, attorneys challenge
the state's evidence, introduce documents and testimony supporting their case,
and argue to the court about interim orders that should be issued. 143 At each of
these hearings, courts make important decisions about parenting time, placement,
services, and ultimately, the permanency goal in the case. 144 By the time of the
final TPR hearing, the record in the case is already shaped by what occurred at
the preceding review hearings. 145 In many ways, the final TPR hearing is akin to
the concluding paragraph of a lengthy article in which the main arguments are
summarized. To conclude that this "final paragraph" is the most important part
of the child welfare case would be to misunderstand the nature of the
proceedings. 146
Within this construct, where attorneys play an important role in creating the
record that the court then relies upon to base its TPR decision, simply providing
an attorney for a parent at the final TPR hearing is not an adequate remedy for
the months, if not years, during which the record in the case was being created
by the other parties. 147 The late arriving parent's attorney has no opportunity to
shape the case or undo past mistakes-the attorney's role is limited to
challenging what has already been done.148 The attorney also has no chance to
engage in important advocacy outside of court, where negotiations regarding key
issues typically occur. 14 9 These omissions render the record at the time of the
TPR hearing materially incomplete.
The incompleteness in the record created by the trial court's failure to
appoint counsel at the right time makes it impossible for an appellate court to
gauge the precise harm to the litigant caused by the mistake. To place the
burden on parents to go back in time and re-create, with certainty, what the case

143. See supra Part nI.
144. See Badeau et al., supra note 45, at 230.
145. See Fresno Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lucia R. (In re Ronald R.), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22,
29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
146. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the permanency planning hearing is the "critical juncture in
the dependency proceedings .... It is at this juncture, and not at the subsequent ... hearing, that the
critical decision regarding parental rights is made.").
147. Yet, this is exactly how appellate courts have justified finding that no harm occurred by
the prior deprivation of counsel. See, e.g., Briscoe v. State Dep't of Human Servs., 912 S.W.2d
425, 427 (Ark. 1996) ("Ms. Briscoe was represented in the termination hearing and given an
opportunity [at the final hearing] to challenge the evidence against her and to present evidence on
her own behalf with the full assistance of counsel."); Farmer v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No.
CA 06-185, 2006 WL 2879454, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2006) ("In that hearing, all the
evidence leading up to termination was revisited.").
148. See Briscoe, 912 S.W.2d at 427.
149. See, e.g., Jillian Cohen & Michele Cortese, CornerstoneAdvocacy in the First 60 Days:
Achieving Safe and Lasting Reunification for Families, 28 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 33, 41 (2009)
("Much decision making occurs outside court. Often, the traditional 'social work/child welfare'
sphere, where concrete planning takes place, and the 'legal' sphere, where legally binding decisions
about a family are made, do not connect.").
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would have looked like had they been represented by counsel earlier is precisely
There
the type of "speculative inquiry" that Justice Scalia cautioned against.
is no way for a parent to demonstrate what would have happened had the earlier
appointment been made. 15' The revealing lens provided to Jimmy Stewart in
"It's a Wonderful Life"'152 has no real world companion.
Take, for example, the case described at the outset of this Article, Meza53
In that case, an
Cabrera v. Arkansas Department of Human Services.
incarcerated parent was deprived of the right to a court-appointed attorney for
years prior to the final TPR hearing, but was subsequently provided a lawyer at
the final stages of the case. 154 At the final hearing, the case against Mr. MezaCabrera was overwhelming.' 55 He was serving a very lengthy prison sentence
for the sexual assault of a child, and his children had been residing in foster care
for over three years.' 56 There was very little his court-appointed attorney could
have done to prevent the termination of his parental rights. Not surprisingly,
with the record before it, the Arkansas Court of Appeals, applying a harmless
error standard, concluded that "[Mr. Meza-Cabrera] has not demonstrated how
would have differed had he had the benefit of counsel
the termination proceeding
' 7
before February 2006."' 5
There is no way of knowing with any certainty that the outcome in Mr.
Meza-Cabrera's case "would have differed"' 158 had he been appointed an attorney
159
But, one
at the outset of the case when he was legally entitled to receive one.
can certainly imagine that it "could" have differed. The record indicates that Mr.
Meza-Cabrera's sister and brother-in-law expressed interest in caring for his
children immediately after the children entered foster care and they actually took
the step of filing a motion with the court requesting a change of custody." The
court delayed the consideration of the motion for nearly six months and
ultimately rejected the request.' 61 The only reason proffered by the case worker
for why she thought placement should be denied was that she "was concerned

150. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
151. Cf. id. ("It is impossible to know what different choices ... would have [been] made, and
then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings.").
152. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). In the film, the lead character George
Bailey is given the opportunity to see what the town where he lived would have been like had he
never existed. Id. Appellate courts, faced with an inappropriate denial of counsel, speculate about
the opposite-how a case would have proceeded had counsel been present.
153. No. CA 07-932, 2008 WL 376290 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008).
154. See id. at *4.
155. See id. at *1-2.
156. See id.
157. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id.at *1.
161. Id.
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[that] [the62 relatives] did not believe [Mr. Meza-Cabrera] had done anything
wrong."'

Timely appointment of counsel for Mr. Meza-Cabrera could have ensured
that this issue of placing the children with relatives was fully presented to the

court in an expedited manner. Presenting this issue to the court at the outset of
the case-as opposed to two years after the children had entered foster care-

would have raised completely different issues, as the factor of the children's
bond with their current foster parents 163 would have been irrelevant since no
such bond would have existed. If the trial court was persuaded by counsel's
argument and the placement with the relatives had been made, then Mr. MezaCabrera would have had a clear defense to the termination of his parental rights.

Federal law does not require the filing of a TPR petition if a child is living with
relatives, 164 and Arkansas specifically lists a permanent relative
placement as a
65
potential permanency option in a child welfare proceeding.'
Would this argument have succeeded? There is no way of knowing the
answer to this question in hindsight, four years after the argument should have
been made by the attorney who should have appeared in the case.

What is

certain, however, is that it is entirely possible that the argument could have
succeeded, and if successful, would have dramatically altered the posture of the

case. This possibility exists in nearly every case in which counsel is erroneously
denied as overwhelmed courts and child welfare agencies

routinely make

factual and legal mistakes, rely on inaccurate information, overlook key pieces of

162. See id. at *2.
163. See id. at *1.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (2006) (listing permanent placement with relative as a valid
permanency option).
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(c)(5) (West 2009).
166. Courts and child welfare agencies are overwhelmed. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Child
Welfare Cases Overwhelm Family Court, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Jan. 10,
2008, 4:29 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/child-welfare-cases-overwhelmfamily-court-report-finds/ (noting that over a two year period "the average annual caseload for a city
judge rose 56 percent-to about 2,200 from about 1,400-while the number of Family Court judges
stayed the same"); Kim Kozlowski, Overloaded System Endangers Foster Kids, THE DETROIT
NEWS, Nov. 21, 2006, at IA ("Michigan's growing foster care caseload, lack of foster families and
cuts to abuse prevention programs have prompted critics to charge that the system ... is stressed
and flawed."). Turnover of caseworkers handling child welfare cases is extremely high, which
results in inadequate care for children. See Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley,
Meeting the Challenges of Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FUTURE OF CHILD. 75, 83 (2004).
Caseworkers bum out and leave the profession in very high numbers. See id. Ninety percent of
state child welfare agencies report difficulty in recruiting and retaining workers. Id. The annual
turnover rate in the child welfare workforce is 20% for public agencies and 40% for private
agencies. THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE UNSOLVED CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM REFORM: THE
CONDITION OF THE FRONTUINE HUMAN SERVICES WORKFORCE 41 (2003), available at

http://www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/the%20unsolved%20challenge.pdf.
At least fourteen
jurisdictions have been, or currently are under, federal court supervision for their failure to meet the
basic needs of foster children. See Class Actions, CHILD. RIGHTS, http://www.childrensrights.org/
reform-campaigns/legal-cases/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
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information, and rely on incorrect statements of law. 167 Appellate courts are in
no position to engage in anything but a speculative inquiry when trying to
ascertain the precise impact of an unlawful and prolonged deprivation of
counsel. 168 The effects of the deprivation are "unknown and unknowable."' t 69

Considering that this type of violation affects the entire framework of the
decision making process and its precise impact cannot be measured in any
reliable way, the only suitable remedy for these errors would be to deem them
"structural errors," requiring automatic reversal of the TPR decision.' 70 This is
precisely what the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned in criminal
cases, t17 and the logic underlying its holdings is equally applicable if not
stronger in child welfare proceedings, where the error has a high likelihood of
infecting the entire case.
An automatic reversal rule has other benefits. It would send a clear message

to trial courts about the importance of appointing counsel for parents in a timely
manner, as state statutes require.

73

Case law and practice both reveal

ambivalence on the part of many trial courts towards this right;'

74

and the

167. See, e.g., R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that
the trial court erroneously found that a child had been living in foster care for fifteen of the
preceding twenty-two months, an error "that was directly significant to the later termination of [the
parents'] parental rights"); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Mason (In re Mason), 782 N.W.2d 747, 757
n.15 (Mich. 2010) ("[T]he court made several factual errors when it considered the length of the
child protective proceedings.").
168. See, e.g., In re Christopher C., 499 A.2d 163, 165 (Me. 1985) ("We cannot determine, in
the instant case, the effect the testimony given at the preliminary hearing had on the court's final
order relating to the custody of the minor children.").
169. See In re Interest of J.J.B., 818 P.2d 1179, 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing a TPR
decision because the trial court denied counsel to the parents during the adjudicative and review
stages of the case).
170. Appellate courts in California have applied differing standards of appellate review
depending on whether the deprivation of counsel is a constitutional or statutory violation. For a
constitutional violation, they have applied a structural error standard, whereas for a statutory
violation, they have forced parents to demonstrate the harm of the error. See, e.g., L.A. Cnty. Dep't
of Children's Servs. v. Paul S. (In re Andrew S.), 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 674-75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994). This approach, however, makes little sense because the primary justification for an
automatic reversal rule is not related to the type of right that was violated, but instead to the
impossibility of conducting meaningful appellate review when counsel is completely denied to a
parent.
171. See supra text accompanying note 5.
172. See White v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 483 So. 2d 861, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) ('The situation is similar to that relating to counsel for a defendant charged with a
misdemeanor .... [Ilf dependency proceedings are to be part of a later proceeding resulting in
permanent loss of parental custody, the parents should have, or knowingly waive, counsel." (citing
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972))).
173. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.807(l)(a) (West 2003) (requiring the court to advise
parents of their right to counsel at each stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding and to
appoint counsel for indigent parents).
174. See, e.g., Meza-Cabrera v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 07-932, 2008 WL
376290, at *1, *2 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) (noting that the trial court allowed several orders to
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harmless error standard only strengthens this ambivalence by permitting courts
to deprive the right to those appearing "too guilty" to deserve a lawyer-that is,
those most likely to be unable to demonstrate clear harm. An automatic reversal
rule would put trial courts on notice that conducting any child welfare
proceeding in the absence of parent's counsel would result in the automatic
reversal of any subsequent TPR decision. Few trial courts would wish to assume
this risk.
In turn, ensuring that parents are provided counsel at every hearing would
yield benefits for children. Recent evidence reveals that strong parent
representation significantly improves the likelihood and speed of reunification,
reduces delays in the case, and lowers the chance that a parent's rights will be
terminated.1 75 Data also suggest that these positive outcomes for children could
potentially save child welfare systems millions of dollars since a child's length
of stay in foster care could be drastically reduced. 76 By ensuring the timely
appointment of parent's counsel, the automatic reversal standard would serve as
a valuable tool to safeguard this key procedural right.
Finally, the clear standard would expedite the consideration of this issue on
appeal. No longer would appellate courts be forced to engage in a fact-intensive
"speculative inquiry" to ascertain the specific harm of an error that occurred
years ago. 177 Instead, when confronted with a violation of a parent's right to
counsel, their response would be straightforward-the TPR decision would be
automatically reversed without looking at the merits of the case. This is
precisely the approach appellate courts have adopted when counsel is deprived at
the final TPR hearing.
By applying a consistent approach to denials of
counsel, appellate review of this issue would be more efficient, straightforward
and timely. And again, all parties and actors in the child welfare system would
have explicit notice of what is required as it relates to the provision of counsel
for parents. Instead of adhering to a "no harm, no foul" rule, trial courts would
be governed by a "no lawyer, no TPR" policy.

be entered into the record at the TPR proceeding even though the parent was not represented by
counsel at those earlier hearings).
175. See supra text accompanying note 87. See also In re D.M.K., 796 N.W.2d 129, 133
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010) ("The adjudicative and dispositional processes embodied in Michigan law
and our court rules envision that early and meaningful parental participation facilitates the
determination of the most beneficial permanency goal.").
176. See Bridge & Moore, supra note 90, at 37 ("[T]he enhancement of parents'
representation has the potential to save increasing millions in state funding on an annualized
basis.").
177. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text (describing the difficult, fact-intensive
questions courts are forced to ask when engaging in the harmless error analysis).
178. See cases cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The application of a harmless error standard by appellate courts reviewing
erroneous denials of counsel in child protective cases has undermined a critical
procedural right that safeguards the interests of parents and children. Case law
reveals that trial courts, on numerous occasions, have improperly rejected valid
requests for counsel, and parents have been forced to navigate the child welfare
system without an advocate. Appellate courts have excused these violations by
speculating that the denials caused no significant harm to the parents, which is a
conclusion that a court can never reach with any certainty.
The only appropriate remedy for this significant problem is a bright-line rule
requiring the automatic reversal of the TPR decision in situations where a parent
is denied the assistance of an attorney at critical stages of the case leading up to
the TPR hearing. This rule is consistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
concerning the denial of counsel in criminal cases and would, as a matter of
policy, lead to better outcomes for children in foster care. And undoubtedly, it
would help further the appearance of a just decision making process that respects
the rights of all parties affected by the child welfare system, an important
consideration given current perceptions of the system.
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